二十国集团（G20）领导人峰会将于9月4日至5日在杭州举行。中国作为主办方，将同其他与会各方一道，围绕“构建创新、活力、联动、包容的世界经济”主题，以及“加强政策协调、创新增长方式”、“更高效的全球经济金融治理”、“强劲的国际贸易和投资”、“包容和联动式发展”和“影响世界经济的其他突出问题”等重点议题展开讨论，为国际合作提示方向。
引人注目的是，本次峰会期间，习近平主席将与美国总统奥巴马举行2013年以来的第八次会晤，这将是奥巴马八年任期内对中国的最后一次访问，人们关注这会对中美关系发展和两国在全球层面的协调与合作带来什么样的总结和具有哪些指向意义。而杭州正是44年前《中美上海公报》最后谈判的地点。
三个层面协调值得关注
在当前全球治理体系面临变革之际，中美具有举足轻重的作用，两国在三个层面上的协调值得关注。
首先，中美能否释放更加明确的信号促进全球经济稳定增长？
G20机制的创建本身就与中美共同意愿和主动协调息息相关，两国的紧密合作为机制的健全发挥了关键作用。2008年以来新兴经济体、特别是中国，在构建全球应对危机的机制化努力中贡献突出，使由美欧金融危机引发的世界性金融动荡稳定下来，并带动世界经济逐渐复苏。
2009年G20第二次峰会在伦敦举行时，我是中国驻英国大使。记得在那次会议上，各国领导人努力探索恢复全球信贷和就业市场活力、促进经济增长的路径，达成了筹集1.1万亿美元的扶持计划。中国作为发展中国家，第一次参与国际金融救助，承诺以购买国际货币基金组织（IMF）债券的方式出资500亿美元。这个标志性事件将中国推上了参与稳定全球金融大盘的位置。
当前世界经济复苏势头并不稳固，新兴国家也相继遭遇困难。各国对拉动增长的手段有不同认识，有的主张有空间的国家运用财政政策以提振全球需求，也有的强调财政纪律和供给侧改革，西方国家的货币政策也不一致。新形势呼唤新共识，人们期待世界主要经济体在杭州峰会上商定采取什么样的财政、货币政策和结构性改革，以实现“强劲、可持续和平衡增长”。
中美作为世界第二和第一大经济体，两国的政策协调对全球经济增长至关重要。中美能否为促进全球经济再平衡的多边共识确定基调，引人注目。2016年6月北京第八轮中美战略与经济对话期间，双方已认识到结构性改革对保持两国乃至世界经济持续增长的重要性，中方承诺在适度扩大总需求的同时加强供给侧结构性改革，美方承诺在货币政策正常化过程中充分考虑对国际金融市场的外溢性影响，提高政策透明度和可预期性。
其次，中美能否共同释放引领全球治理改革的信号？
近年中美关系的一个亮点是，双方协调合作的触角加快向全球层面延展。例如，两国率先就减排方案达成共识，为2015年巴黎气候变化大会取得成功奠定基础。再比如，两国共建核安保示范中心，为加强全球核安全合作提供了范例。中美还在塞拉利昂等非洲国家开展防治传染病和帮助改善公共卫生体系的合作。在反恐、防扩散、打击海盗、禁毒等方面，中美合作取得实际成果，在伊核、朝核、阿富汗、苏丹等涉及国际安全的热点问题上，双方也有着比较有效的协调。即便在分歧明显的网络安全领域，中美也确立了《打击网络犯罪及相关事项指导原则》，建立起热线。
但中国作用的上升在美国受到一些猜忌。2010年G20首尔峰会就IMF份额和治理结构改革方案达成原则共识，但美国国会拖延到2015年底才最终通过，使之获得正式生效。2015年10月人民币进入特别提款权（SDR）篮子。
中国国内生产总值（GDP）达到世界第二位以来，在国际事务中发挥更大作用的能力和意识上升，尤其是在自己擅长的经济领域。中国提出的“一带一路”倡议，代表着21世纪国际经济合作的新方向，中方创建亚洲基础设施投资银行等新机制，为完善全球治理提供新型公共产品。美方对此不大适应，视之为二战后美元主导的金融体系遭遇的最大挑战，采取了怀疑和抵触的态度，甚至游说盟友抵制。但随着中方努力展现积极效应，美国智库较快调整看法，批评政府短视，未来中美合作的可能性是存在的。
2015年9月习近平主席访美期间双方商定，要确保国际经济体系具有包容性、韧性且不断得到完善，以应对当前和未来的挑战；要在IMF机制下加强合作，并继续完善IMF的份额和治理结构。双方的新共识富有积极意义：“新机构以及未来将成立的机构，要成为国际金融框架的重要贡献者，与现有国际金融机构专业性、透明度、高效率和有效性的原则以及现有环境和治理高标准相一致，进行恰当的设计和运营，同时认识到上述标准是在持续演进和改进的。”可以预期，在G20杭州峰会上，国际金融架构建设、特别是金融部门改革仍将是领导人共同审议的重要课题，有望就如何构建更有韧性的国家金融架构、建立开放和稳健的金融体系、建立宏观审慎政策框架和发展普惠金融形成重要成果。中美两国透露的信息显示，双方在工作层保持着密切的磋商。
中美需要超越利益和观念上的分歧，培育合作习惯，双方越来越认识到，虽然中美合作解决不了所有全球问题，但没有中美合作，任何全球性问题都难以获得好的解决。
第三，中美能否共同释放管控战略分歧和安全矛盾的信号？
奥巴马执政八年间，中美关系有起有伏，虽屡生摩擦，但在双方共同努力下守住了协调合作的主流。两国在经济和人文领域的交往更加全面，两军之间规范性对话得到完善，确立了《中美海空相遇安全行为准则》等规范。尤其在应对全球性问题上与中国的合作将成为奥巴马政府的重要外交遗产。
奥巴马政府也给中美关系留下一些负面资产，让人们印象最深的，当属“亚太再平衡”战略突出军事部署和强化同盟体系，给中美之间带来新的战略互疑。美国强化排他性的同盟体系建设，同时高调介入南海问题，决定在韩部署“萨德”反导系统，纵容日本推行旨在摆脱战后束缚的“军事正常化”措施。这些重大信号不能不影响到中国人对美国战略意图的判断，加深了许多人对美欲对华遏制围堵的怀疑，推动中方考虑必要的战略应对。
过去四年，中方以两国元首2013年“庄园会晤”、2014年“瀛台夜话”、2015年“白宫秋叙”为主要节点，围绕共建中美新型大国关系与美方进行了全面深入的探讨，希望排除干扰培育互利双赢的合作模式。尽管美方对中方倡议存在疑虑，但双方“不对抗、不冲突、合作共赢”的意愿是相近的。随着2016年美国总统大选的举行，中美关系将进入新的政治周期，两国顶层战略对话更显重要。人们预期，中美元首杭州会晤将再次把正方向，实现管控矛盾和促进合作的作用，为中美关系的再起航奠定好的基础。
中美需要管控南海分歧
中美元首杭州会晤前的中美关系，经历了因南海仲裁案掀起的波澜。问题是，美国与中国在南海争的到底是什么？双方能否找到一条相容的路径？对这些问题的认识和处置将决定未来南海局势的方向。
美国介入南海事务最常用的说辞是维护航行自由。诚然，南海有重要的国际通道，航行自由对各国都重要，最重视南海航行自由的莫过于中国这个国际贸易和航运大国。但实际上美方关心的主要是非民用舰只的“航行自由”，中美对这方面的规则存在认识上的差异，对《联合国海洋法公约》相关条款有不同解读，特别是对在别国专属经济区内可以从事什么样的军事活动分歧较大。中国作为发展中国家珍视国家主权和安全，认为《公约》要求外国军舰和飞机的航行自由和飞越自由不能危及沿海国的安全，他国舰机在己方专属经济区内的军事活动应受到一定的限制等。而美国作为海洋强国，历来主张弱化沿海国的主权，强调自己的军队可以在他国专属经济区进行与公海相同的各种军事活动，包括进行各种军事检测活动和军事演习。
南海商业航行自由不存在问题，而在规则方面的分歧不难通过沟通予以解决。但美国对规则的关注只是表象，根本问题还在于美国将与中国在南海的博弈上升到亚太主导权之争的高度，从地缘战略的角度看待与中国的分歧和摩擦。美国自重返亚洲、实施“亚太再平衡”战略以来，似乎就预设了中国崛起后会扩张的前景，不断强化防范部署，南海早已成为美国实施亚太战略的抓手。在预设的地缘战略竞争的背景下，中方的任何举动都容易被解读成削弱美国战略优势的行动；而美方的针对性言论和动作也必然引发中方反弹。在这种“安全困境”下，中美在南海对抗升级甚至引发冲突的风险增加，国际社会对中美陷入地缘竞争的担忧加大。这个趋势也是中方需要警惕和制约的。
最近发生的南海仲裁案在中国引发了强烈的舆论反应。中国反对的不是《联合国海洋法公约》，甚至不是仲裁作为解决分歧的方式本身，而是仲裁庭的组成以及仲裁方式呈现出的对公约签约国所让渡的权力的滥用。我们希望围绕这个问题所进行的辩论可以让人们都再次认识到，冷战之后东亚国家所秉持的友好协商，而不是诉诸对抗性的方式是明智的。
南海周边国家越来越认识到，紧张局势不能让任何一方获益，相反只会阻碍地区一体化和经济合作的步伐。中国与东盟国家都希望尽快翻过南海仲裁案这一页，让地区局势回归安宁。近日，菲律宾总统杜特尔特委派前总统拉莫斯为“特使”为中菲关系破冰，我应邀在香港与他会面，感觉菲律宾新政府是有与中方改善关系、重启合作意愿的。同为亚洲国家，相信只要有诚意，中菲不难找到克服困难、恢复友好合作关系的路径。
南海局势中的美国因素增加了不确定性，能否恢复平静也取决于中美采取什么态势，尤其当中国的领土主权与海洋权益与美方所谓的“最高利益”发生碰撞时，两国能否准确判断形势、厘清利害关系，找到协调彼此立场的恰当角度。中美在处置彼此关系上都面临新课题，美国缺乏与“非敌非友”大国友善相处的经验，而中国也没有以世界大国的身份与世界超级大国互动的历史体验。双方都在摸索，彼此的言行也在塑造对方的言行，宜保持谦逊，更新思维，不能简单套用旧的观念和模式。
南海浩瀚辽阔，任何国家都难以实现完全排他性的控制。任何一方试图打造绝对排他性势力范围，结果只能导致地缘对抗甚至兵戎相见。可行之道恐怕还是力量、利益和规则的共存共融。中国作为南海最大的沿岸国和对南沙岛礁拥有主权的国家，应有自己合理的海洋权益，美方应予尊重，中国与周边国家和平解决分歧的努力不应受到干扰。同时，中美应在保持安宁和维护国际通道畅通方面寻求对话和理解。至于中美在海洋规则上的分歧，最好的解决办法是对话与沟通，而非政治施压，或用武力进行危险的试探。目前双方都已表达了支持通过对话和平解决争议的态度，在海上的行动亦是克制和有底线的，可见在保持和平稳定的大局上中美愿望是接近的，关键是在对具体利益分歧的处置上，需要有效沟通和防止误判。
超越“修昔底德陷阱”思维
大约2400年前，古希腊历史学家修昔底德写出巨著《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》，描述了雅典人的崛起及其在斯巴达人心中引发的恐慌是如何使得战争在新兴国家和守成国家之间无法避免。1980年，美国作家赫尔曼?沃克在一次演讲中首次使用“修昔底德陷阱”概念，用来警告美苏之间冲突的风险。2012年，哈佛大学的格雷厄姆?艾利森教授再次对这个历史隐喻进行了量化研究，并运用到对中美结构性矛盾的论述中。他和他的团队研究了人类历史上新兴大国与守成大国互动的16个案例，发现多数走向了战争，只有四例（包括美苏冷战）得以用非战争的方式处置利益冲突。这项研究似乎想证明大国实力增减的宿命式结局。
去年12月我在新加坡与艾利森一起出席一个对话会，我们有机会讨论，我认为中美若成为敌人，整个世界的命运都会改变。他对此完全认同，但对中美可能因台湾或南海问题爆发战争的前景感到担忧，认为若此，那将是崛起大国和守成大国掉进“修昔底德陷阱”的教科书级案例。也是在那次对话会上，艾利森在演讲中说，当今时代对美国来说，最优先的地缘战略挑战不是暴力的伊斯兰极端主义分子，也不是冒进的俄罗斯，而是中国快速崛起带来的影响，而对中美关系内在风险的低估增加了这一风险爆发的可能性。
我在发言中表达了不同的观点。我认为，经济全球化、国际制度的发展、国家间相互依存以及核威慑对战争的抑制作用决定了，当今世界已非一战、二战和冷战时的世界，更非古代雅典和斯巴达在爱琴海争夺海权时那个孤立的小世界，难以简单化地谈论“修昔底德陷阱”是否会复制。需要考虑的是，在现代文明水平上，应如何更加智慧地处置国际关系中那些能引发大国矛盾、激化大国竞争和诱发大国冲突的更加复杂的因素。
如今，关于大国安全困境的焦点集中在中美身上。无论理论体系和预测模式有何不同，中美两国未来如何塑造彼此关系被公认为将界定21世纪世界的基本方向。2015年9月22日，习近平主席在美国西雅图发表演讲时指出，世上本无“修昔底德陷阱”，但大国之间一再发生战略误判，就可能自己给自己造成“修昔底德陷阱”。奥巴马总统其后在华盛顿与习主席的会晤中回应说，他不认同守成大国和新兴大国必将发生冲突的“修昔底德陷阱”，大国尤其是美中之间更要尽量避免冲突，相信两国有能力管控好分歧。
中国是成长中的大国，人口是美国的四倍。美国则宣称要“继续领导世界百年”，与中国的矛盾是多重的。例如在美国总统大选中，候选人都夸大和渲染中美经贸领域的利益冲突，但毕竟两国利益深度交融，在现实生活中这方面的矛盾应是可控的。美国对中国政治制度的排斥使双方分歧难以化解，但中国已强大到外力难以撼动其政权和制度，双方可以避免挑战彼此。目前比较突出的是在战略安全层面上双方信任赤字扩大，相互误判的风险上升，双方需要认真对待和坦诚探讨，争取构建起防范机制，防止滑向对抗和冲突。
美国一个挥之不去的担忧是中国要与之争夺秩序主导权。问题是中美对世界/国际秩序的认识不同，因此需要厘清具体分歧是什么、如何解扣。美国试图维护的是“美国领导下的世界秩序”，由美式价值观、军事同盟体系和以联合国为中心的国际机制共同支撑。但中国至少在两个方面不被包容：一是西方对中国政治制度是排斥和压制的；二是美国领导的集体防务安排并不涵盖中国安全利益，且与中国的共同安全、合作安全理念南辕北辙。中国认同的是以《联合国宪章》宗旨和原则为核心的国际秩序，中国是其创建者之一，也是其获益者和贡献者。中美秩序观并非完全对立，对世界总体和平与发展的需求和对以联合国为中心的多边主义的需求是双方的交叠面。长远看，如果中美要防止落入大国为争夺秩序主导权而直接对撞的历史覆辙，就需要在共识基础上最终搭建一个能见容于各方和全面包容各方利益的共同秩序屋顶。
世界在经济全球化的冲击下，利益的多元化和格局调整，对中美引领变革提出要求。两国可以从共同利益最多的经济、金融等领域入手，通过推动全球治理等，带动国际协调与合作跟上全球化的步伐。
冷战后以资本、技术和市场要素自由流动为基本特征的全球化席卷世界各个角落，以美国为首的西方曾主导和推动了全球化的快速扩张，新兴国家不仅从中获益，而且以自身的增长反哺了全球经济成长。全球化极大地促进了人类财富的增加，发达和发展中国家都从中获益。但全球化也日益暴露出弊端，例如导致分配不公、贫富分化、制度不健全、金融监管缺失等，广受诟病，助长了保护主义和民粹主义倾向。
可以认为这一轮全球化是现代意义上的“1.0版”，处于初级阶段和缺乏管理。一段时间以来，逆全球化和逆区域化的趋势有较多表现，例如东亚一体化进程受到国家间矛盾的困扰，势头减缓；美国主导的《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》（TPP）缺乏包容性引发质疑；英国脱欧也给欧洲一体化提出挑战。从趋势上看，世界不可能从全球化倒退，但是其弊端也必须摒弃，向全球化“2.0版”的升级需要各国共同努力，尤其需要中美共同努力、砥砺引领，追求共赢而不是单赢，这样方能向构建“人类命运共同体”的方向努力。
对于中国而言，让世界充分理解自己的意图更加紧迫。与发达国家的现代化历程相比，中国改革开放30多年就从一个贫穷落后的国家成长为世界第二大经济体，可以说是一种“压缩型”的成长，但思维的进步和话语的更新难以简化或者压缩。我们需要加快更新理念和思维，构建更广阔的国际视野、更有效的行为方式和话语系统，使外界更好地理解和认识新时期中国特色大国外交的政策和以和平合作、共享共赢为目标的外交主张。
（作者：全国人民代表大会外事委员会主任委员、中国社科院国家全球战略智库首席专家、中国国际经济交流中心特邀副理事长 傅莹）
Collaboration and Conflicts:
Some Reflections on China-U.S. Relations on the Eve of the G20 Hangzhou Summit
Fu Ying
The 2016 G20 summit will be held on 4-5 September in the Chinese city of Hangzhou. China as the host, stands ready to work with other members under the theme of building an “Innovative, Invigorated, Interconnected and Inclusive World Economy" to hold open discussions over several key priorities, namely, “breaking a new path for growth through strengthened policy coordination,” “more effective and efficient global economic and financial governance,” “robust international trade and investment,” “inclusive and interconnected development” and “other outstanding problems that affect world economy.” The summit is expected to provide indications for future international cooperation.
In Hangzhou, Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Obama will have separate meetings, which will be their eighth since 2013. And this will be Obama’s last visit to China as President. So it is likely that there will be a lot of attention on what impact their meeting will have on China-U.S. relations. Coincidentally, Hangzhou is also where the concluding part of the negotiations for the China-U.S. Shanghai Communiqué took place 44 years ago, in 1972.
Can China and the U.S. work together, through their differences, to ensure the G20 Hangzhou summit is a success?
As China and the U.S. play critical roles in the transformation of global governance, their agreement in the following three aspects is worth watching.
First, can China and the U.S. send clearer signals that can help world economic growth?
The establishment of the G20 mechanism itself can to some extent be credited to the joint political will of China and the U.S., as they closely cooperated at its founding. And the two countries continue to contribute to its advance. Emerging economies, and China in particular, have been active parties in the institutional effort to respond to the world financial chaos spread from the U.S. and Europe after 2008.
As the Chinese ambassador to the UK when the second G20 summit was held in London during 2009, I remember the G20 leaders managed to pull together a US$1.1 trillion package of scheme to rescue international finance, credit, employment and bolster the overall economy. This was the first time China, as a developing country, participated in international financial aid and pledged to buy US$50 billion in IMF bonds. This significant step brought China onto the world stage to get involved in stabilizing global finance.
The world’ economic recovery has not yet stabilized, and emerging markets have also come across serious challenges. Differences emerged among countries on how to boost growth. Some think those who can should take measures to stimulate aggregate demand. Others emphasize fiscal discipline and supply side reform as the way forward. The Western developed countries are also pursuing different monetary policies. New developments call for new consensus. The major economies meeting in Hangzhou are expected to find consensus on how to use fiscal and monetary policies as well as structural reforms to promote “strong, sustained, and balanced growth.”
Understanding between the U.S. and China, which are the two largest economies in the world, will be at the forefront in setting the tone for the multilateral consensus needed to rebalance the global economy.
During the eighth China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in Beijing in June 2016, the two sides acknowledged the importance of structural reform to the sustained economic growth of the two countries as well as the world at large. China pledged to further its supply side structural reforms while expanding domestic demand. And the U.S. committed itself to taking full account of the spillover effect on the international financial markets, and improving policy transparency and predictability when normalizing its monetary policy.
Second, will China and the U.S. be able to signal that they will lead the efforts to reform global governance?
One of the highlights in China-U.S. relations in recent years is that the two countries have rapidly extended their cooperation to the global level. For example, China and the U.S. took the lead by agreeing on emission reduction programs, which paved the way for the success of the Paris Conference on Climate Change in 2015. China and the U.S. also jointly set up the Center of Nuclear Security Excellence in Beijing, setting a model for global nuclear security cooperation. The two countries are also working in the area of pandemic prevention by improving local public health system in African countries such as Sierra Leone. China and the U.S. have achieved visible results in counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, anti-piracy, and drug control. They have also engaged in cooperation on hot spot issues that affect international security such as the nuclear programs of Iran and the Korean Peninsula, as well as on Afghanistan, and Sudan. Even on cyber security, where they have disagreement, the two sides have managed to establish a hot line and agreed on the guidelines to jointly fight against cybercrimes.
But China’s growing role on the world stage has also raised some concerns in the U.S. For instance, at the G20 summit in 2010, the IMF agreed to reform its quota and governance to reflect the increasing importance of emerging market economies. But the U.S. Congress did not approve the changes until the end of 2015. In October 2015, the IMF officially agreed to include China’s RMB into its benchmark SDR currency basket.
As China rose to the second largest world economy, the country has grown in its awareness and responsibilities to do more in the world, although its initiatives are mainly in the economic arena, where most of its success comes from. For example, China put forward the “Belt and Road” initiative, which is about developing a vast new economic belt, stretching towards Europe in the west and facilitating maritime cooperation to the east. This, I believe, represents a new form of international economic cooperation for the 21st century. To support this idea, China has also promoted mechanisms such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which should improve global financing and governance. The U.S., however, became uneasy and saw these initiatives as a big challenge to the dollar-led global financial system. The U.S. administration viewed them with suspicion and objection, and even tried to dissuade its allies from supporting them. Nonetheless, as the Chinese efforts start to show positive effects, U.S. think tanks quickly moved to adjust their views and criticized the shortsightedness of the U.S. administration. It is possible that the U.S. may join these efforts in the future.
During President Xi Jinping’s visit to the U.S. in September 2015, the two countries agreed to ensure an inclusive, resilient, and constantly improving international economic architecture to meet challenges now and in the future; China and the U.S. are committed to strengthening their cooperation in the IMF, and continuing to improve the IMF's quota and governance structure. They agreed that: “for new and future institutions to be significant contributors to the international financial architecture, these institutions, like the existing international financial institutions, are to be properly structured and operated in line with the principles of professionalism, transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness, and with the existing high environmental and governance standards, recognizing that these standards continuously evolve and improve.”
At the G20 Hangzhou summit, the international financial architecture, particularly the reform and development of the international monetary system, will be important subjects to be reviewed by the leaders. It is expected that the summit will achieve important outcomes regarding how to build more resilient national financial architecture, open and prudent financial systems, macro-prudential policy tools and frameworks and inclusive finance. Information coming from China and the U.S. shows that the two sides are already engaged in thorough consultations.
China and the U.S. need to go beyond their differences and nurture the habit for cooperation, as they are increasingly aware that although they cannot solve all global problems, without their collaboration, none will be successfully solved.
Third, can China and the U.S. send the signal that they are willing to manage strategic differences and avoid security conflicts?
In the eight-year Obama presidency, there have been ups and downs in China-U.S. relations, yet with joint efforts, the two countries managed to keep the relationship constructive through coordination and collaboration. The past years have seen the economic ties quickly expanding and people-to-people exchanges increasing. Even the two militaries have improved their regular dialogues and agreed upon a code of conduct for close encounters at sea or in the air. Moreover, working with China in addressing global challenges will be an important foreign policy legacy of the Obama Administration.
There are also “negative assets.” The mostremembered would be the Asia Pacific rebalancing strategy, which has only deepened mistrust between China and the U.S. It is noted in China that the American military has continuously reinforced deployment in the West Pacific, and reemphasized the exclusive military alliance system. Against this background, the U.S. has started to take sides in the South China Sea disputes and has decided to deploy the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea. The U.S. is also perceived to be condoning Japan’s move toward “military normalization,” which is aimed at moving away from the post-WWII rules. All these signals are strategically important and will influence the perception and judgment of the U.S., with many in China have growing doubts about America’s intentions.
In the past four years, President Xi Jinping and President Obama have held long and intensive meetings, on many occasions focusing on building the new model of major-country relations between China and the U.S.and on how to overcome resistance and cultivate mutually beneficial cooperation. Although the U.S. remains apprehensive about China’s initiatives, the two sides are not far apart in their belief that China and the U.S. should not move to confrontation or conflict and that they should pursue win-win cooperation.
As the U.S. presidential election is approaching, China-U.S. relations will move into a new political cycle. Consequently, the top-level strategic dialogue is all the more important and it is hoped that the China-U.S. presidential meeting in Hangzhou will offer guidance to ensurethe two countries can better manage their differences, thus paving the way for the next stage of their fruitful crucial bilateral relationship.
China and the U.S. Need to Manage Differences over the South China Sea
Relations between China and the U.S. in the run up to the Presidential meeting in Hangzhou have hit some rough patch caused by the South China Sea arbitration. The question is, what exactly are the two nations competing over in the area? And more importantly, can they find a mutually acceptable way to move forward? How the two countries perceive and handle these issues will define the future of the evolving situation in the South China Sea.
The U.S. claims that its interest in the South China Sea is to ensure freedom of navigation. Indeed, critical shipping lanes run through the area, and keeping them open is important to all countries. China, a major global trading power, attaches no less importance to freedom of navigation than the U.S. does, perhaps even more.
Obviously, however, that’s not all the U.S. is concerned about. It’s worry is mainly about preserving freedom of navigation for naval warships and other non-commercial vessels. Here, admittedly, there’s a gap between how China and the U.S. each interpret the relevant provisions in the the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as corresponding customary rules of international law.
In particular, the two sides have significant differing views on the kind of military activities allowed within another country’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone, or EEZ. China, as a developing country, highly values its national sovereignty and security. It holds that under UNCLOS, the principle of freedom of navigation shouldn’t be used to undermine the security of coastal countries, and that military activities in a country’s EEZ should be under certain constraints. On the other hand, the U.S., as global maritime power, has traditionally believed that its military is entitled to absolute freedom of navigation in other countries’ EEZs, including oceanographic surveying, surveillance and military exercises.
Now, just as there’s no dispute over allowing freedom of navigation for commercial ships in the South China Sea, there’s no reason why the two sides couldn’t also wisely manage their differences over the rules for naval vessels. What the U.S. really wants, though, goes beyond its expressed concerns.
In fact, the U.S. views frictions with China from a geo-strategic perspective, seeing the South China Sea dispute as a test of which power will predominate in the Asia Pacific. Ever since U.S. leaders started talking about a “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia, they’ve worked under the assumption that a stronger China will inevitably pursue expansionism--and thus needs to be countered by the U.S. and its allies.
Against this background, any move by China naturally looks like an attempt to weaken U.S. strategic primacy in the region. And at the same time, American rhetoric and activities clearly targeted at China are bound to trigger a strong Chinese reaction. Given such a “security dilemma,” the risk of escalated China-U.S. confrontation or even conflict is becoming increasingly serious and the international community are more worried about the possible geo-competition between the two countries, which also calls China to pay attention to and avoid.
The recent Arbitration ruling in the case brought by the Philippines against China has aroused strong rhetorical reaction in China, which is not opposed to the UNCLOS, or even to arbitration as a means of dispute settlement, but simply to the way this particular tribunal was constituted and chose to rule, which has been perceived as an abuse of power. Hopefully, given the fierce debate over the tribunal’s verdict, people in the region will again see the wisdom of dealing with such issues through friendly dialogue rather than confrontational means.
The countries bordering the South China Sea surely appreciate that tension stands in the way of regional integration and economic cooperation, to no one’s benefit. Both China and the ASEAN countries hope that this page can be turned, so that tranquility can return to the region. Recently, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte appointed former President Fidel Ramos as a special envoy to China for an ice-breaking trip. When I was invited to meet with Mr. Ramos privately in Hong Kong, I clearly sensed the new Philippine administration’s willingness to improve relations and re-launch cooperation with China. China and the Philippines are both Asian countries and I believe that as long as there is good faith, it’s not beyond our reach to find ways to overcome difficulties and restore a relationship marked by friendship and cooperation.
Whether the South China Sea remains peaceful is, however, to a large extent dependent on how the U.S. and China choose to interact with each other. Specifically, when China’s sovereignty and maritime are deemed to conflict with what the U.S. sees as its core national interests, it is vital that the two countries read the situation accurately, be clear about the stakes and find an appropriate angle from which each other’s positions can be appreciated.
There’s room for both China and the U.S. to manage their relations better. The U.S. lacks experience in dealing with powers that are “neither ally nor foe,” while China has never interacted with the world’s super power from a position of strength. Both sides are still exploring, and what they say and do will shape each other’s opinion and actions. They both need to remain humble, keep learning and avoid simply resorting to old beliefs and behavior.
The South China Sea is too vast to be controlled by any single country. Any attempt to build an exclusive sphere of influence may lead to possible confrontation and even military conflict. The only way forward is to seek coexistence and an overall harmonization of power, interests and rules.
China is the biggest coastal state bordering the South China Sea. It has sovereignty over the Nansha (also known as the Spratly) archipelago and controls several islands and reefs there. It’s only fair that China is entitled to legitimate maritime rights and interests in the area. The U.S. should respect these and shouldn’t hamper efforts by China and the neighboring countries to seek peaceful ways to address their differences.
In the meantime, China and the U.S. must continue to pursue meaningful dialogue, based on a shared commitment to ensure the maintenance of peace, security and unimpeded access to shipping lanes in the South China Sea. The best way to address their differences on maritime rules is by talking to one another, instead of posturing or or dangerously testing each other with their military forces. Now that both have expressed support for peaceful settlement of disputes and the two countries have also restrained their reactions, it can be hoped that China and the U.S. can move towards taking measures to stabilize the situation. And the key is for them to have effective dialogue and prevent miss-judgment when handling specific issues, especially when their interests come into conflict.
China and the U.S. should free themselves from the “Thucydides Trap” Complex
About 2,400 years ago, the Athenian historian Thucydides wrote the great book “History of the Peloponnesian War,” offering a powerful account of the rise of Athens and how “the fear that this inspired in Sparta” made war between a rising power and an established power inevitable. In 1980, American writer Herman Wouk first used the concept of the “Thucydides Trap” to warn about potential conflict between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. In 2012, Harvard Professor Graham Allison conducted quantitative analysis of this historical metaphor, and drew an analogy between the “Thucydides Trap” and the structural difficulties in the China-U.S. relationship. Professor Allison and his team found that in the majority of the 16 cases in human history in which a rising power has confronted a ruling power, the result was war. Only in four cases (including the Cold War), the powers managed to handle their conflict of interests in ways other than war. This research seems to suggest that war is predestined for major countries that are going through power shift.
Last December, I had the opportunity to discuss this with Professor Allison when we were attending a forum in Singapore. I suggested that should China and the U.S. become enemies, the future of the whole world would be altered. He fully agreed, but nevertheless, expressed concern over the possibility of war between China and the U.S. triggered by Taiwan or the South China Sea issue, which, if either becomes true, would be a textbook case of how a rising power and a ruling power fall into the “Thucydides trap.” During this forum, Professor Allison said in his speech that for the U.S., the preeminent geostrategic challenge of this era is not violent Islamic extremists or a resurgent Russia, it is the impact of China’s ascendance, and it is an underestimation of the inherent risk in China-U.S. relations that has increased the possibility of war.
I offered different views in my comments. I said that the effect of economic globalization, the development of international institutions, interdependence among states and nuclear deterrents all points to the fact that today’s world is totally different from those of WWI, WWII and the Cold War, and it is even a further cry from the isolated small world in ancient Greece, where Athens and Sparta fought over the Aegean. The “Thucydides trap” cannot be simply transplanted from then to now. What we should consider now is how, from the heights of our modern civilization, we can use our knowledge to more wisely address the complex factors that may trigger tension, competition and conflicts between major powers.
At present, when talking about the major power security dilemma, the attention is on China and the U.S. It is widely acknowledged that how the two countries shape their bilateral relationship will define the general direction of the world in the 21st century.
President Xi Jinping, when speaking during his U.S. visit in Seattle on September 22, 2015, said: “There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.” In their meeting in Washington later, President Obama was reported to have responded to President Xi’s remarks that he didn't believe in the "Thucydides trap" where conflicts were inevitable between existing and emerging powers, and that major countries, the U.S. and China in particular, should avoid conflicts. He also said he was confident that the U.S. and China have the ability to manage their differences.
China is a growing power with a population four times that of the U.S. The U.S. is a super power that claims to “continue to lead the world for a century to come,” and its difficulties with China appear to be complicated and multifaceted. For example, during the American presidential election, every candidate has tried to blame China for the U.S.’ economic problems and play up conflicts of interest between the two countries. But in the real world, difficulties in this area are not impossible to manage given the two countries’ deeply integrated interests. The political differences are harder to resolve because of the U.S.’ critical attitude about China’s political system. But as China has become too strong to be undermined by outside powers, the two sides should be smart enough not to challenge each otheron this front. The current main concern lies with the rising trust deficit in the field of strategic security, which may lead to misjudgment on both sides and increase the possibility of confrontation and conflict. The two sides need to face the issues candidly and work to build mechanisms to prevent escalation.
A persistent concern troubling the U.S. is that China is attempting to replace it as leader of the world order. But the question is: do China and the U.S. have the same understanding about what the world/international order is? It’s important that we tease out what exactly our differences are and how to disentangle them.
What the U.S. strives to preserve is a “U.S.-led world order,” which rests upon American values, its global military alliance structure and the network of international institutions centered on the United Nations.
China is excluded from this order in at least two aspects: First, China is ostracized for having a different political system; second, America’s collective defense arrangements do not cover China’s security interests. It also stands in contrast to China’s common and cooperative security concept. What China identifies with is the international order underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. China was among the first countries to put its signature on the UN Charter, and has been one of its beneficiaries and contributors. Nonetheless, China and the U.S. do not necessarily have completely opposing views on “order”. They largely agree with each other on the world’s general need for peace and development, as well as the importance of multilateral institutions with the UN at its core. Should China and the U.S. wish to avoid sliding into the so-called Thucydides trap of a head-on clash between a rising and an established power, they’ll need to create a new concept of “order” that is more inclusive and can accommodate the interests and concerns of all countries, providing a common roof for all.
The world has been witnessing sweeping economic globalization, which is creating diversified interests and structural changes. This new phenomenon also calls for China and the U.S. to lead with reforms where they have more agreement, for example, in the economic and financial areas. The two countries should be able to take the lead to mobilize international coordination and collaboration to improve global governance and keep pace with the trend of globalization.
The post-Cold War economic globalization is characterized by the free flow of capital, technology and market factors fromthetraditional Western center to the periphery. The U.S. and the West promoted and facilitated the rapid expansion of globalization, from which the emerging countries not only gained but also in return contributed with their own growth. As a result, globalization greatly boosted the expansion of human wealth, benefiting both developed and developing countries alike. But the flaws of globalization have also been increasingly felt and criticized widely for causing inequality, widening gaps and insufficient oversight in the financial systems, thus,fueling the rise of protectionism and populism.
We can regard this as the initial stage of globalization or “globalization 1.0” in its modern sense, which is not yet well regulated. There are already some developments going against the trend of globalization and regional integration. For example, East Asia integration is weakening due to friction among nations in the region; the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is viewed with concerns about its lack of inclusiveness; the “Brexit” has also presented new challenges for the European Union, etc. Obviously, globalization can’t be reversed and the world can’t retrogress, but its flaws must be addressed. To upgrade to a “globalization 2.0” requires the concerted efforts of all countries, and in particular, for China and the U.S. to take the leadership, in pursuit of a win-win instead of win-and-losesituation. This is also in line with the idea of building a “community of mankind.”
For China in particular, it is imperative that we make ourselves better understood by the rest of the world. China has grown from a poverty-stricken country into the world’s second biggest economy in a little over 30 years. Compared with the developed countries, China’s modernization has been “compressed” to a degree previously unheard of. However, it is not so easy to compress progress in thinking and discourse. We in China must improve our ideas and ways of thinking faster and form a broader international vision, with more effective modes of expression and behavior. In this way, the rest of the world will be able to better appreciate our culture and the reasons why we talk and act the way we do. This will also help them to understand China’s foreign policy goals as we move into a new era with China inevitably plays a major role in global affairs. (END)
Ms. FU Ying
Chairperson of Foreign Affairs Committee of China's National People's Congress; Chairperson of Academic Committee of China's Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Specially Invited Vice Chairperson of China Center for International Economic Exchanges
